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Abstract 
 
Birth of the Federal Reserve: Crisis in the Womb 
 
 
 The outbreak of World War I shut the New York Stock Exchange for more 
than four months. The conventional explanation maintains that the closure 
prevented a collapse in stock prices that threatened a repetition of the Panic of 
1907. This paper shows that the Wilson Administration encouraged the 
suspension of trading to pave the way for launching the Federal Reserve 
System, which was in the process of being born. Closing the Exchange helped to 
forestall an outflow of gold. Federal Reserve insiders considered an adequate 
stock of gold crucial to the success of the new monetary system.  
 
JEL Classification: E42, N22, E58  
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I. Introduction 
 
 A confrontation between systemic risk and market liquidity occurred at the 
outbreak of World War I, just as the Federal Reserve System was being 
organized. On July 31, 1914, European investors seemed poised to liquidate 
their holdings of U.S. stocks and bonds to transfer gold to Europe to pay for the 
war. Policymakers worried that a stock market crash and gold outflow would 
cause an economic collapse similar to the consequences of the 1907 bank 
suspensions. 1 The crisis called for central bank intervention. The problem was 
that Congressional hearings on President Wilson’s nominations to the Federal 
Reserve Board were still in progress and the regional Federal Reserve banks 
had not yet been organized.  
How did policymakers respond to the crisis? They shut the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) on July 31, 1914 to prevent a collapse of stock prices 
and to help stem the gold outflow. The Exchange remained closed for more than 
four months, until December 12th, despite the United States not yet being a 
combatant in the war.   
Sprague [1915, p. 513], in a follow-up to his classic 1910 study of crises 
under the National Banking System, applauds the decision to close the 
Exchange: “If the stock exchange had not closed on Friday, July 31, it is certain 
that the decline in the price of securities during the day would have been so 
extreme as to have occasioned numerous failures of brokers and their customers 
and presumably much loss to the banks as well.” Friedman and Schwartz [1963, 
                                            
1 A contemporaneous view of the crisis is summarized in Noble [1915, pp.13-4] and Sprague 
[1915]. More recent perspectives appear in Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.172], Meltzer [2003, 
p.82], and Sobel [1968, p.327-331].   
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p.172] accept Sprague’s account of the crisis. Chandler, in his celebrated 
biography of Benjamin Strong2 [1958, p.55], extends Sprague’s observation: “A 
general money panic would almost certainly have occurred if the Exchange 
remained open with falling security prices, widespread calling of loans 
collateralized by securities, and large foreign sales increasing the burden of 
foreign payments.”  
Sprague’s contemporary analysis and Chandler’s retrospective articulated 
what could have happened, but my evidence will demonstrate that the threatened 
stock market crash evaporated before the end of August. My data also 
undermine the speculation that stock prices would have collapsed had the New 
York Stock Exchange been open on July 31st.  
Why did the Stock Exchange remain closed for more than four months? 3 I 
will show that individuals at the Federal Reserve fostered the delay to insure a 
successful launch of the System. The Federal Reserve Act, signed into law on 
December 23, 1913, required that gold be held as backing for Federal Reserve 
Notes. The Fed would not be effective, according to influential insiders, if it were 
                                            
2 Benjamin Strong became the first Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 
October, 1914. He is considered the most influential member of the Federal Reserve System 
during its formative years (see Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.225, 411] and Meltzer [2003,  
p.193].  
3 The London Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse suspended normal trading during this period, 
but, unlike the United States, England and France had already been drawn into the war. The Wall 
Street Journal [September 28, 1914] indicated that the Bourse remained closed, in part, “because 
so many exchange members had joined the army.” Michie [1999, p.144] makes a similar point 
when explaining the reasons for London’s closing: “Germans were the single most important 
group of non-British among both members and clerks.”  Keynes [1915, p. 462] adds that “…the 
failure of an important firm…who were largely concerned in business with Germany brought 
home to members of the Stock Exchange the character of the situation.” Keynes [p. 461] also 
notes that Paris faced a logistics problem: “…the Paris Parquet remained…open to a certain 
extent up to the impending evacuation of Paris by the Government on September 2nd.”       
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rushed into existence without sufficient gold. Keeping the Exchange closed 
helped restrain the gold outflow, paving the way for the new currency system.4  
President Wilson and Treasury Secretary McAdoo recognized that the 
United States was in the midst of a major shift in institutional structure. To insure 
a smooth transition to the new monetary order they agreed to sacrifice stock 
market liquidity. An effective substitute market emerged after the trading 
suspension,5 although they had no way of knowing that when the decision was 
made to close the Exchange.  
Wilson and McAdoo followed a two-part strategy with respect to the 
Federal Reserve System. They satisfied their instincts and rushed the Board of 
Governors into existence to provide wise counsel. They heeded the warnings of  
gold enthusiasts at the Fed and deferred the opening of the individual Reserve 
Banks until the horizon cleared.   
 
II. Countering the Immediate Threat  
 
 Like many crises under the national banking system (see Sprague [1910]), 
the outbreak of World War I threatened to force banks to suspend the 
convertibility of deposits into gold if they could not meet their customers’ demand 
for currency. This time it was European investors who would liquidate their dollar 
denominated securities on the New York Stock Exchange, receive checks drawn 
on U.S. banks and then demand payment in gold, as was their right under the 
gold standard. With a fractional reserve system there simply was not enough 
                                            
4 The regional Federal Reserve banks opened on November 16, almost a month before the re-
opening of the New York Stock Exchange. 
5 For an extensive discussion of this point, see Silber [2003].  
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gold to go around. And without a central bank to supply an alternative reserve 
asset, bank suspensions would trigger a repeat of the economic contraction that 
followed the Panic of 1907.  
 On August 1, 1914 the Wall Street Journal reported a three-pronged 
defense against the financial threat:  “President Wilson has taken strong steps to 
protect the United States against the tremendous financial and commercial 
pressure caused by the European war. He practically made up his mind to send 
one and possibly two nominations for the Federal Reserve Board to the senate 
before the close of the day… He directed Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo to 
take all possible steps to insure the financial stability of the nation and he 
approved the closing of the New York Stock Exchange…McAdoo said: ‘The 
Aldrich-Vreeland Act, as amended by the Federal Reserve Act, is still in 
force…currency may be issued under that act… to meet any emergency.’”  
Wilson succeeded almost immediately in legislating each part of his crisis 
management strategy.  Of the three components, the relatively obscure Aldrich-
Vreeland emergency currency was by far the most important in combating the 
economic threat, despite Treasury Secretary McAdoo’s reference to it 
 [1931, p.214] as “a feeble emergency measure.” Closing the Exchange merits 
an assist but the Federal Reserve System arrived after the battle had been won.  
 
II.1 Aldrich-Vreeland Currency 
 The issuance of emergency currency, originally authorized by the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act of 1908 and extended by the Federal Reserve Act until June 30, 
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1915, was designed precisely to avoid a repetition of the Panic of 1907. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.441], the Aldrich-Vreeland Act 
enabled banks “to convert their assets into additional high-powered money,” by 
authorizing groups of banks, known as National Currency Associations, to apply 
to the U.S. Treasury for emergency currency in exchange for approved bank 
assets. A number of features of the Act were archaic, especially the provision 
that the emergency currency could be issued only by banks already having 
banknotes (currency) outstanding secured by U.S. bonds equal to 40 percent of 
their capital. In 1914 many large banks had no such currency notes outstanding.6      
On Tuesday, August 4th, Congress amended the terms of the Act to 
expand its scope and magnitude. The New York Times [August 5,1914] reports: 
“President Wilson signed the bill amending the Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency 
Currency Act to provide a practically unlimited supply [my italics] of emergency 
currency. More than $1,000,000,000 may be added. Under the amended 
bill…banks will be able to issue currency notes equal to 125 percent of the 
combined capital and surplus of the banks.” 
 The Wall Street Journal reported on August 5th and 6th that $11 million of 
the emergency currency has actually been issued and that “$100 million had 
been shipped to the sub-treasuries in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, 
San Francisco, Boston and Philadelphia in order that the needs of the banks may 
be promptly supplied. In many cases banks have applied for additional currency 
                                            
6 The Wall Street Journal [August 5th] reports: “Although a great many banks in New York city 
have applied for emergency currency, so far the majority have not been able to obtain the 
notes…[because] they have not the requisite…circulation already outstanding. This applies to the 
National City Bank among others.”   
 7
merely as a precautionary measure.” At the peak in October, 1914, banks 
needed less than $400 million7 out of the one billion dollar allotment.  
The speed of the policy response to the perceived emergency no doubt 
contributed to its success. Crises disappear if they fail to get started. Friedman 
and Schwartz [1963, p. 196] summarize: “By the time the Federal Reserve Banks 
opened for business in the middle of November 1914, the country had recovered 
from the immediate shock of the declaration of war in Europe, thanks in no small 
part to the availability of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency.” 
 
II.2 Closing the Stock Market 
If Aldrich-Vreeland currency saved the day, why did the New York Stock 
Exchange have to close? Despite the decline of 8.05 percent on Thursday, July 
30th in the New York Stock Exchange’s average of 50 stocks, almost no one 
expected the NYSE to suspend trading on July 31st.  On that same morning the 
front page of the New York Times carried a headline that read: “Bankers Here 
Confer on War: Closing of Stock Exchange Not Necessary, Meeting at Morgan 
Offices Decides.”  The public explanation for the suspension of trading was 
summarized in the Times the next day (August 1st): “There had been no call for 
the meeting, and the understanding was that the Exchange would open as 
usual…but the discovery that the market was loaded down with big selling orders 
and almost bare of buying orders…alarmed the brokers so much that they 
hurried upstairs to urge a reconsideration of the decision to remain open.”   
                                            
7 According to Meltzer [2003, p.82], a maximum of $308 million was used while Friedman and 
Schwartz [1963, p.172] put the number at $364 million.  
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We know now, thanks to McAdoo’s autobiography [1931, p. 290], that at 
9:30 on Friday morning, July 31st, J. P. Morgan, Jr. relayed a message to the 
Governing Board of the New York Stock Exchange from Treasury Secretary 
McAdoo, suggesting that the NYSE close. According to Henry Noble [1915, 
pp.11-12], President of the New York Stock Exchange, the Board voted to 
suspend trading less than fifteen minutes before the scheduled 10am opening 
bell on that Friday.  
Although President Wilson did not legislate the Exchange closing, the 
Administration obviously did more than just approve it. Moreover, once the 
Exchange was closed, McAdoo used his influence to keep it shut. As early as 
August 2nd, the New York Times wrote: “It would not surprise officials in 
Washington if Mr. McAdoo used his influence in New York to keep the New York 
Stock Exchange closed for some time. No direct proposal of this kind may be 
made but he is expected to show that the Government does not look kindly upon 
the reopening of the exchange at this time.” Was that because of the ‘clear and 
present danger of a stock market collapse’ or was it something else?  
It must have been something else because the evidence shows:  
(1) Stocks probably would not have declined very much had the Exchange 
remained open on the 31st; (2) Even if the uncertainty justified a ‘circuit breaker’ 
closure on the 31st, the threat of a market collapse was over by the end of 
August. 
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II.2.1 Stock Prices on July 31, 1914             
 No one has verified the conventional wisdom, published in the August 1st 
New York Times, and memorialized by Sprague [1915, p. 513], that brokers 
experienced an overnight build-up of sell orders to be executed on July 31st. The 
NYSE closed before the opening. However, the Consolidated Stock Exchange8, 
located in New York and trading primarily “odd-lots” of NYSE listed securities 
opened (as usual) at 9:30 on July 31st, but then closed at 10am when the NYSE 
voted to close.   
Table 1 shows the six stocks that traded during that 30-minute session. 
Column (1) lists the stock, column (2) lists the July 31 closing price at 10am on 
the Consolidated Exchange and the percentage change from the NYSE close on 
July 30, and column (3) lists the closing price on the NYSE for July 30 and the 
percentage change from July 29. All of the stocks showed considerable declines 
on July 30th.  In the abbreviated trading session on the Consolidated Exchange 
on the 31st, two stocks rose, two remained unchanged and only two declined. 
Western Union dropped the most – a decline of 4.4 percent.  
European investors probably would not have directed their orders to the 
Consolidated Exchange. Only a few hundred shares of each stock traded during 
that first half hour. But the information of a substantial overhang of sell orders on 
the NYSE should have been reflected in the prices on the Consolidated 
Exchange. The transactions prices on the Consolidated Exchange fail to confirm 
rumors of the overnight build-up of sell orders. 
                                            
8 For the origin of the Consolidated Exchange see Nelson [1907]. Its demise in 1926 is discussed 
in Sobel [1972].    
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II.2.2 Stock Prices During August and September 
 Evidence that stock prices were stable accumulated during August and 
September. I have shown (see Silber [2003]) that prices on New Street, the 
substitute market that traded NYSE listed stocks in the street, were virtually 
unchanged during the last few days of August compared with the closing prices 
on July 30th. During September prices hovered about 2 ½ percent below July 
30th. Moreover, I have also shown that even though the popular press blacklisted 
New Street prices, Henry Noble, President of the NYSE, monitored New Street 
quotes.  And if Noble knew that stock prices on New Street were stable, so did 
Secretary McAdoo.  
Although European investors would have found it difficult to transact in 
New Street because of the absence of clearing facilities, transactions prices on 
New Street would have reflected war related information, including the threat of 
European liquidation.9 Thus, the stability of stock prices on New Street suggests 
that if the NYSE had reopened at the end of August the expected deluge of 
selling would not have materialized.10 The Wall Street Journal [September 10, 
1914] confirmed that judgment by reporting: “Liquidation of foreign holdings of 
the shares of United States Steel Corporation during the trying period preceding 
the closing of the Stock Exchange11  was surprisingly small. If the selling of Steel 
                                            
9 In late October New Street prices declined by about 9 percent compared with July 30 closing 
prices because of adverse developments in Europe (see Silber [2003] and Noble [1915, p.43]).  
10 By way of contrast, Michie [1999, p.148] reports that unofficial trading in London confirmed that 
prices on the London Stock Exchange would have fallen dramatically had London re-opened. 
London remained closed until January 4, 1915.        
11 The ‘trying period’ refers to the week ending July 31st, when the NYSE average of 50 stocks 
declined by 11.1 percent. There had been rumors that substantial foreign selling of U.S. securities 
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shares by foreigners can be regarded as a barometer…then the many reports 
of… [liquidation] have been greatly exaggerated.” 
If stock prices were relatively stable, why did McAdoo use his influence to 
keep the Exchange shut?12 Part of the answer is that the Exchange could remain 
closed without creating investor resentment because an effective substitute 
source of liquidity had emerged. The public could trade on New Street, which 
offered liquidity to those who needed it (see Noble [1915, pp. 38]). The clamor to 
re-open the Exchange came from the brokers,13 who had lost their livelihood. But 
to McAdoo that was less important than insuring the successful launch of the 
safety net of the future – the Federal Reserve. We will see that keeping the 
Exchange closed helped protect the birth of the new monetary system.  
 
II.3 A Split Opening for the Federal Reserve  
 Treasury Secretary McAdoo knew how important the Federal Reserve 
System could be in dealing with the crisis. On August 1st, the New York Times 
reported:  “After a conference with the President, [Treasury] Secretary McAdoo 
expressed the belief that there should be no further serious delay in getting the 
                                                                                                                                  
drove down prices. Sprague [1915, p. 508] observed:”…the overwhelmingly large sales of 
securities by foreign holders on the New York Stock Exchange on Tuesday July 28 and on the 
two following days.” It is surprising that Sprague ignored the U.S. Steel disclosure that few 
foreigners had liquidated their holdings between June 30th and August 31st. According to the Wall 
Street Journal [September 10, 1914], US Steel was the most widely held U.S. security in Europe.            
12 On August 27th the Wall Street Journal said: “…intimations have been received from 
Washington to the effect that the opening of the Exchange would be considered undesirable by 
the Government officials who realize that…every effort should be made to relieve the strain on 
the country’s monetary system.” Recall the New York Times’ observation on August 2nd that Mr. 
McAdoo would use his influence to keep the Exchange closed for some time.    
13 Various stock exchanges, representing their brokerage house constituents, regularly called for 
a resumption of trading during the period of suspension. Noble[1915, p.34] reports that as early 
as August 5th, the Baltimore Stock Exchange urged that trading be resumed. The Wall Street 
Journal [August 17, 1914] reported that the Consolidated Stock Exchange called a Board meeting 
to consider steps to trade.         
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new reserve bank system fully organized… The international character of the 
Federal Reserve banks under the new law is broad and flexible in the matter of 
dealing with gold coin and bullion…”  
But McAdoo also knew how much the bankers opposed the new system. 
He observed [McAdoo, 1931, p.213]: “Bankers fought the Federal Reserve 
legislation – and every provision of the Federal Reserve Act – with the tireless 
energy of men fighting a forest fire.”14 The bankers invoked the crisis of World 
War I as a delaying tactic. On August 5th the New York Times reported that the 
general sentiment among bankers was: “…the present is not an auspicious time 
for the installation of the new banking system.”  
To get the System going but to avoid unnecessary pitfalls, McAdoo 
engineered a split opening. The Board was confirmed on August 7th, only days 
after President Wilson rushed the last two nominees -- Paul M. Warburg and 
Franklyn A. Delano -- before the Senate for approval. After the swearing-in 
ceremony on August 10th McAdoo said [New York Times, August 11, 1914]: “We 
are going to be able to make this System a bulwark against financial 
disaster...These banks could have been organized by the 1st of August, but due 
to causes over which we had no control the organization was not perfected by 
that date. The fact that the Board itself has been organized means that the Banks 
can certainly be organized by the 1st of October, or sooner.”  
The Federal Reserve Act conferred the right to set the date for opening 
the regional Banks on the Secretary of the Treasury (see Meltzer [2003, p.74fn]). 
                                            
14 Chandler [pp.32-6] confirms banker opposition to the Federal Reserve Act. This does not imply 
that bankers were against the establishment of a central bank in the United States. Rather, they 
were unhappy with this particular version of the legislation.  
 13
McAdoo clearly wanted the banks to open sooner, rather than later. 
Nevertheless, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks did not open until November 
16th.  What caused the delay?  
 
III. The Gold Problem    
 On Sunday night, August 2nd, McAdoo traveled to New York to meet with 
leading bankers to hear their views about gold.15 In 1914, gold and foreign 
exchange were intertwined by the gold standard.  
Under the rules of the gold standard, the exchange rate between U.S. 
dollars and British pounds (Sterling) fluctuated in a narrow range around $4.8665 
per British pound, the mint parity exchange rate determined by the gold content 
of the dollar and the pound (see Yeager [1966]). The demand for British pounds 
versus dollars should never, under normal circumstances, force the exchange 
rate above the mint parity by more than the cost of shipping gold to London. 
Under those conditions, it would pay to ship gold to satisfy obligations abroad 
rather than to buy Sterling above the ‘gold export point’.  
Estimates of the gold export point varied with shipping costs and 
insurance. The Wall Street Journal noted [July 31, 1914]: “…the most 
experienced operator would never have dreamed that any combination of 
circumstances could have arisen to drive demand sterling to 4.98, or about ten 
cents above the ordinary gold export point.” Thus the Journal calculated the gold 
export point at $4.88 on July 31st, and reports that sterling sold at $4.98. On 
                                            
15 The New York Times [August 3, 1914] reports McAdoo saying: “I came to New York for a 
conference with leading bankers about the issuance of national bank currency…and for a 
discussion of measures for the protection of the gold supply of the country.   
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August 5th the Journal quoted Sterling between “6.25 @ 6.75 … with practically 
no business done.”16  
As long as Sterling stayed above the gold export point, the pressure to 
send gold abroad would continue. The Wall Street Journal noted on July 29th 
“…the engagement of gold on a large scale for shipment to Paris and London.” 
Only the jump in the real cost of shipping gold, because of war related risks, 
deterred gold exports.17 When the Bank of England established a gold depository 
in Ottawa, Canada, however, everyone knew the shipping barrier disappeared. 
The New York Times [August 12th] reported: “Owing to the severe straits into 
which the war had plunged foreign exchange, the news [about Ottawa] aroused 
instant opposition among New York financiers.” 
The disarray in the foreign exchange market hurt business, but what 
mattered most to bankers was that U.S. obligations were payable either in dollars 
or in gold. Failure to pay gold, if it were demanded, would cause irreparable 
damage to the credit worthiness of U.S. corporate and municipal securities. 
Bankers always worried about credit worthiness, but especially in 1914. Back 
then bankers had placed many of these securities with their European 
counterparts. The Europeans would surely demand gold rather than dollars 
under wartime conditions. 
                                            
16 Sterling had been above the gold export point beginning with July 27th. The Wall Street Journal 
[July 31, 1914] explains the premium on Sterling as follows: “There was a large short interest in 
the market when Austria surprised the world by sending her ultimatum to Servia [Serbia], 
representing those who had sold for future delivery…While there was no immediate necessity for 
evening up their commitments, the shorts were faced with the possibility that even higher rates 
would obtain when their obligations fell due.” On August 5th the Wall Street Journal continued: 
“The banks have already sold the exchange against the gold, and unless the metal goes 
forward…they will be that much ‘short’ of exchange.”    
17 The Wall Street Journal noted on July 31st that the “increase in the cost of insuring gold 
shipments had raised the gold export point.”  
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Bankers supported the suspension of trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the issuance of Aldrich-Vreeland currency because they both 
served to conserve gold.18 The New York Times said on August 1st: “…the 
closing of the Exchange put an additional barrier in the way of gold export, and 
perhaps it was the only means to that end which was at hand.” Closing the 
Exchange would help prevent gold exports even if every potential European 
seller were met by a domestic U. S. purchaser to produce stable stock prices. 
European sellers were likely to present checks for payment to domestic U.S. 
banks and demand gold, the only universally acceptable medium of exchange.19 
Domestic investors did not represent the same threat to the U.S. gold supply, 
especially with bank access to Aldrich-Vreeland currency for meeting cash 
withdrawals.20  The New York Times article emphasizes the connection by 
noting: “…an additional measure of protection for our gold supplies [is the] 
circulation provided under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act…which will supply any local 
demand for cash without putting it out in a form that could be immediately taken 
for export.”  
Note the specificity of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act. It resolved the problem of 
a domestic shortage of gold because it provided legal tender within the U. S. but 
                                            
18 Bankers also supported the suspension of trading because they worried about the impairment 
of the stock exchange collateral backing their brokers’ loans. They were safe as long as prices 
remained officially frozen at the July 30 closing quotes. Stable New Street prices minimized this 
problem.  
19 Sprague [1915, p. 510] says: “…the disturbing effect of these [stock exchange] sales was 
almost wholly due to the fact that they were sales by foreign holders rather than [because of] the 
quantities offered for sale.”   
20 The availability of Aldrich-Vreeland currency also made up for the illiquidity of brokers’ loans 
(the stock exchange collateral could not be sold). Sprague [1915, p.513] says:” The effects upon 
banks of locking up part of their assets…proved less serious than was at first anticipated.” He 
goes on to say [p.519]: “Thanks again to the emergency notes …the banks were able to meet 
requirements for additional loans occasioned by the crisis.”     
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it did not satisfy international requirements. How did the bankers prepare to meet 
foreign obligations? They formed a gold pool.  
 
III.1 The Gold Pool  
 On August 28th the Federal Reserve Board called a conference at the 
Treasury Department for the following week to discuss “a solution to the foreign 
exchange problem.” Representatives of Bank Clearing House Associations were 
invited to attend [New York Times, August 28, 1914] and to bring: “…such data 
as it is possible to furnish regarding the present United States cash indebtedness 
to Europe [including] maturing obligations, and vice versa.” 
 Some of the most prominent bankers in the country responded to the 
invitation. On September 4th, the day of the conference, the New York Times 
reported: “Messrs. A.H. Wiggin [President of the Chase National bank] and 
Benjamin Strong, Jr. [President of Bankers Trust Co.]21, who will represent the 
New York Clearing House, carried with them to Washington data supplied by 
most of the international banking houses showing the amount of money owed in 
Europe and the amounts of credit available... It was understoood in the financial 
district that [Wiggin and Strong] will propose the formation of a gold pool to 
provide at least $200 million in gold for shipment abroad.”  
 The New York bankers did not disappoint. Wiggin and Strong proposed 
the gold pool and suggested that “the Reserve Board should name committees at 
the reserve centers to apportion the balance needed among the Clearing House 
                                            
21 The New York Times says Vice President of Bankers Trust, but Chandler [1958, p.31] notes 
that “Strong became President of Bankers Trust in January, 1914.”  
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Banks.” The proposal had an immediate effect on foreign exchange. On 
September 5th the Wall Street Journal reported: “There is a good deal easier tone 
to the foreign exchange market…attributed in large measure to the meeting 
taking place in Washington. Sterling was quoted at $5.01½, a decline of 2 cents 
since Thursday and 5 cents since the high this week.”     
The Federal Reserve Board appointed a Committee headed by James B. 
Forgan, president of the First National Bank of Chicago, to implement the gold 
pool plan. The “Forgan Committee” consisted of Benjamin Stong of New York, 
L.L. Rue of Philaelphia, S. Wexler of New Orleans, and T. P. Beal of Boston. 
Despite the wide geographic representation, Benjamin Strong dominated 
subsequent events. According to the New York Times, on September 10th, 
Strong, J.P. Morgan, Jr., and Jacob Schiff met with Treasury Secretary McAdoo 
for 2 ½ hours to discuss the Plan. Later that day the three New York bankers met 
with the Federal Reserve Board.  
 As these discussions proceeded, a series of fortuitous developments 
obviated the pressing need for the gold pool. The Wall Street Journal reported on 
September 15th that: “Consummation of the plans to meet the $100 million of 
New York City’s maturing securities, $80 million of which are held in England and 
France, was the most constructive development that has taken place since the 
war started…There has been evidence that England, the largest foreign holder of 
our securities, is not as anxious to liquidate as might be supposed. About 75% of 
the holders of… Lake Shore one-year notes elected to take new notes…in 
exchange for maturing securities. One of the bankers in charge of that financing 
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said: ‘When they know they can get their money, they are not so eager to have 
it.’”  
The success at rolling over maturing obligations held abroad, combined 
with anouncement on Septemebr 11th (see above) that U. S. Steel experienced 
much less foreign liquidation during the period preceding the closing of the Stock 
Exchange, should have put the gold pool to rest. It also should have advanced 
the timetable for a resumption of trading on the NYSE.  It did neither.22 Foreign 
exchange remained above the gold export point and that posed a danger, 
especially to Benjamin Strong, Jr, who was about to become a central banker. 
 
IV. Benjamin Strong, Central Banker 
 On October 5th, Benjamin Strong, Jr., President of Bankers Trust, was 
elected Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong had refused 
the offer to become Governor of the New York Fed as recently as August 27th 
(see Chandler [1958, p.38]). He reversed his decision after Henry Davison (J. P. 
Morgan & Co.) and Paul M. Warburg, who had become a member of the Federal 
Reserve Board, spent a weekend convincing him of his public duty to accept 
[Chandler p.39].   
 None of the Federal Reserve Banks were open for business when Strong 
became the chief executive officer of the New York Bank. McAdoo, who had 
committed to opening the individual Banks before October 1st, had been 
preoccupied with a series of internal squabbles within the Board, ranging in 
                                            
22 The Wall Street Journal reported on September 14th that the success of the New York City note 
sale led the ‘Forgan Committee’ to reduce the size of the proposed gold pool to $100 million. 
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substance from a philosophical dispute about the relationship between the Board 
and the Treasury to questions concerning appropriate quarters for Board 
members [McAdoo 1931, pp. 285-6]. Once Strong assumed his position in New 
York, McAdoo faced the most formidable obstacle to opening the banks. 
 As a private banker, Strong had taken an active roll in the formation of the 
gold pool because he believed that only gold could insure U.S. credit worthiness 
in Europe [Chandler, p.58].  As a central banker, Strong believed that the Federal 
Reserve Banks should hold far more gold than required by law. Chandler [p.83] 
quotes Strong as saying: “We need an immense safety factor beyond the legal 
minimum and it is for this reason that I have been so urgent about accumulating 
gold.”23 Strong also wanted to make the dollar “an international currency by 
[creating] confidence in the redeemability of dollars in gold at all times [Chandler, 
p.84].”  
As long as Sterling remained above the gold export point, Strong worried 
that the stock of gold in the U.S. would ebb towards Europe. On October 10th he 
wrote to Paul Warburg: “If the Federal Reserve Banks refuse to pay gold they will 
be discredited at the outset, and gold will certainly be demanded of them if they 
expand their note issues when gold will be at a premium…the premium as 
reflected in the price of sterling [Chandler, p.61].” Figure 1 plots Sterling 
exchange rates collected from the Wall Street Journal between July 15, 1914 and 
                                            
23 The Federal Reserve Act required that the System hold gold reserves of 40 percent against its 
liabilities of Federal Reserve Notes. According to Friedman and Schwartz [1963, pp194-5]: “Since 
the Federal Reserve was required to keep a gold reserve of 35 percent of its deposits [reserves 
of member banks], it could use any excess over that amount [the 35 percent]… to meet the 40 
percent requirement for notes.” Strong recognized that to provide for an ‘elastic currency’ to meet 
the needs of commerce and to avoid panics, the System needed excess gold reserves.    
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December 31, 1914.24   On October 1st, Sterling sold at $4.965 and on October 
15th it stood at $4.975, both well above the gold export point, which was now 
$4.90.25 The Wall Street Journal reported almost daily shipments of gold to 
Canada during October.26 
 McAdoo had the legislative authority to open the banks, but Strong’s 
misgivings surely restrained him. The two had met numerous times after 
McAdoo’s August 2nd trip to New York,27 and Strong was not shy about 
articulating his views.28 McAdoo also received a communication in October (see 
Meltzer [2003, p.74]) from Paul Warburg and W.P.G. Harding, members of the 
Federal Reserve Board, confirming Strong’s concern that the System had very 
little gold.  McAdoo also says [1931, p.288]: “I talked in October with the 
governors and chairman of most of the Federal Reserve Banks and nearly all of 
them thought that the necessary preparations [for opening the banks] would take 
considerable time.”  
                                            
24 Figure 1 plots the exchange rate for ‘demand Sterling’ (rather than for cable transfers). 
According to Sprague [1915, p. 500]: “Demand sterling [was] the most significant single exchange 
rate.” Ask prices for demand Sterling are used in the figure since there were fewest gaps in the 
data on ask quotes during this time period. The exchange rate for each date in the table comes 
from the Wall Street Journal of the following day. 
25 On October 27th the Wall Street Journal wrote: “[a] decline in exchange below $4.90…shuts off 
gold exports. This was the gold export point since the bank of England established the gold 
depository in Ottawa.” 
26 The Wall Street Journal recorded the following gold shipments to Canada during October. On 
the 7th: $523,000; 8th: $450,000; 14th: $645,000; 15th: $845,000; 17th: $1,510,000; 20th: $489,000; 
27th: $855,000; 29th: $760,000; 30th: $340,000.  
27 In addition to the August 2nd meeting mentioned earlier, the New York Times lists Strong at the 
following meetings with McAdoo: The August 13th conference to promote U.S wheat exports, the 
September 4th conference on establishing the gold pool, the 2 ½ hour meeting on September 
10th, along with J.P. Morgan, Jr., and Jacob Schiff, to implement the gold pool, and a September 
18th meeting, along with Forgan, Wiggin and Rule, to modify the size of the gold pool.    
28 Chandler [p.3] summarizes the reasons for Strong’s influence: “The strength of his personality 
and the force of his persuasion extended far beyond the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
through the other eleven Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Board, [and] the United States 
Treasury…” 
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Despite these objections, McAdoo felt that “the delay could not be 
justified.”  On October 25th he announced that all Reserve Banks would open on 
November 16th. McAdoo quotes President Wilson [New York Times, October 
27th] as giving the best reason for avoiding further delay: “…an effort to protect 
the [Federal Reserve] System against the strains of the emergency which it is 
designed to relieve is to cast doubt on the system itself.”   
McAdoo [p.289] singles out the “representative of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (FRBNY),” in an almost comical interchange, as trying to 
overturn the decision: 
 FRBNY: “…the bank has no vault or safe place for keeping…gold” 
 McAdoo: “There is a sub-Treasury in New York…[use] its vault.” 
 FRBNY: “Our bookkeeping system is not…ready for the printing of forms.” 
 McAdoo: “Surely you can have enough printing done by November 16…” 
 FRBNY: “We can’t get our office furniture by that time.” 
 McAdoo: “Buy a few chairs and pine-top tables.” 
 The November 16th date set by McAdoo held firm despite the delaying 
tactics of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and its chief executive officer, 
Benjamin Strong, Jr. Chandler [p.61] emphasizes that Strong did not want to 
derail the system, as some of his fellow bankers tried to do. Strong sought the 
delay because “the System might be jeopardized if the Reserve banks were 
subjected to heavy demands when they were…weak in resources.” The 
communication from Warburg and Harding to McAdoo mentioned above 
legitimizes Strong’s concern about the System’s shortage of gold. Chandler 
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[p.65] also supports at least one additional resource shortage in New York: “the 
newly formed bank did, in fact, use the vaults of the New York sub-treasury.”  
 
V. McAdoo’s Insurance Policy 
Why didn’t McAdoo set a date for opening the NYSE, just as he had done 
for the Reserve Banks? The simplest answer is that he had stuck his neck out on 
August 11th by promising to open the Federal Reserve Banks on or before 
October 1st. He had never said anything publicly about the Exchange, except to 
approve its closure on August 1st. Also, contrary to the Federal Reserve Banks, 
he did not have the legislative responsibility to open the NYSE. On the other 
hand, McAdoo surely could have used the same influence to open the Exchange 
as he had used to close it,29 unless he really wanted the NYSE to remain shut.  
McAdoo kept the NYSE closed as his insurance policy. He worried about 
the fundamental risks of shifting to a new monetary regime. In his autobiography, 
McAdoo says [p.278]: “The entire scheme was novel and untried. We were 
dealing with experimental formulas, with principles that had existed only in theory 
and which were to be put to the most practical of tests.” Chandler [p.15] 
emphasizes the risks by noting: “So severe were the financial strains that many 
questioned the wisdom of opening the Reserve Banks in November.” McAdoo’s 
concern as a prudent policymaker, combined with the Strong’s arguments about 
gold, prevented him from doing too much too soon. He opened the Reserve 
                                            
29 Numerous references to Washington’s influence appeared in the press, beginning with the New 
York Times quote of Wilson’s approval of the closing on August 1st to a Wall Street Journal article 
on November 16th saying: “Despite Washington’s belief in the desirability of keeping the 
exchanges closed, bankers … have now entered seriously upon the consideration of ways and 
means to [open the Exchange].”      
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Banks because he (and Wilson) felt they would help solve the crisis that began 
on August 1st. He kept the Exchange closed because he thought the financial 
strains were not completely gone. On November 7th the Wall Street Journal 
quotes McAdoo as saying: “The chief thing that is needed [to re-open the 
Exchange] is a restoration of international confidence. This is, in my opinion, 
almost [my italics] an accomplished fact.” ‘Almost’ was just not good enough 
while the Federal Reserve System was being launched.        
McAdoo announced the November 16th opening for the individual Reserve 
Banks on October 25th. Figure 1 shows that Sterling was above the $4.90 gold 
export point throughout the month (except for a temporary decline to $4.890 on 
the day after McAdoo’s announcement). The Wall Street Journal continued to 
report gold exports to Canada (see footnote 26). Stock prices on New Street had 
fallen about 9 percent below July 30 closing prices as a result of war related 
developments (see Silber [ 2003] and Noble [1915, p.43]). Under those 
circumstances, the NYSE might easily have served as a teller’s window (see 
Noble [p. 65]) for European access to our gold. Keeping the Exchange closed 
helped mollify Strong and sheltered the birth of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
V.1 The Risks Abate  
The middle of November brought a much kinder environment for a 
resumption of NYSE trading. The New York Times [November 13th] heralded a 
bullish stock market by publishing, for the first time, a list of prices for 27 stocks 
trading on New Street. The most encouraging development, however, came from 
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foreign exchange. The Wall Street Journal [November 13th] reported: “The 
foreign exchange market broke sensationally at one time to…$4.87½ for cable 
transfers, well within the present gold export basis, which is usually considered to 
be $4.90 The present level of exchange is the lowest point the market has 
touched since before the declaration of war, and marks the restoration of normal 
conditions.” Figure 1 shows that Sterling remained below the gold export point 
after November 12th.  
Henry Noble [1915, p. 74], President of the NYSE, describes a series of 
favorable meetings during mid-November with George Paish and Basil Blackett, 
representatives of the U.K. government discussing foreign exchange with 
Washington. They encouraged the re-opening of the Exchange at that time.   
The improved conditions cast doubt on the press report of November 16th 
(see footnote 29) saying that the government preferred to continue the 
suspension of trading on the NYSE. It turns out that the reported objection was 
erroneous. Noble [p.79] says that his Committee set Monday, November 23rd, as 
the date for restoring limited bond trading to the Exchange floor. He then notes: 
“On Thursday (the 18th) a well meaning but misguided go-between reported that 
he had communicated with Washington…and [they] expressed a desire to see 
some member of the [stock Exchange] Committee before any further steps were 
taken [to open the Exchange].” Noble reports [p. 80] that he contacted the 
‘Government official’ and received a telegram explaining “that the suggestion of 
an interview had in no way emanated from him.”  
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Bond trading on the NYSE floor resumed on Saturday November 28th. 
Noble [p.82] says that the success with bonds encouraged the Exchange 
Committee to formulate a plan for “carrying the reopening a step further.’ On 
December 12th, stocks that were “not international in character” (see Noble 
[p.83]) were brought to the Exchange floor and on December 15th, all stocks 
were admitted for trading.   
 
VI. Conclusion  
The outbreak of World War I threatened to repeat the conditions that led to 
the Panic of 1907. Most of the credit for averting the crisis belongs to the Wilson 
Administration’s speedy issuance of Aldrich-Vreeland currency. According to 
Benjamin Strong, private banker and central banker, the export of gold to Europe 
jeopardized the birth of the Federal Reserve System. Treasury Secretary 
McAdoo responded to the danger by encouraging the suspension of trading on 
the NYSE for more than four months to minimize the outflow of gold and to 
smooth the way for the new monetary system. On August 28, 1914, the Wall 
Street Journal got it almost right when it said: “To put it frankly, the bankers 
closed the Stock Exchange and the bankers will reopen it, after wise counsel with 
the Federal Reserve Board.”  
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Table 1: Selected Closing Prices for Stocks on July 31, 1914 and July 30, 1914  
 
 
(1)  
Stock 
(2) 
July 31        Percent 
Close          Change 
(3) 
July 30          Percent 
Close            Change 
American Smelting 52 1/2    - 52 1/2 -13.0% 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 87 +2.1% 85 1/4 -7.8% 
Reading Railroad 141 + .7% 140 -9.2% 
Union Pacific 113 1/2     - 113 1/2 -5.4% 
U.S. Steel 51 1/8 -1.4% 51 7/8 -8.6% 
Western Union 51 -4.4% 53 3/8 -6.2% 
 
        Source:  New York Times, August 1, 1914 
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Figure 1: Sterling Closing Ask Prices (1914) 
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Source: Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1914 through December 31, 1914     
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